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The European proposal on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base suggests a sharing mechanism based on the application of an apportionment
formula. This formula includes three different factors (labour, assets and sales) with equal weighting. Despite the virtues of this method, we believe that the
suggested formula is far from being consistent from an economic point of view and that European institutions should revise it before continuing with the
negotiation process. In order to design a new formula, it is vital to take into consideration the objectives of the European proposal and the growing concern
about the phenomenon of profit shifting in the EU context. In the light of these premises, two different alternatives are analysed in this article. On the one
hand, we refer to the possibility of using a two-factor formula for distributing the tax base amongst Member States, based on assets and labour as productive
factors. On the other, we suggest a formula exclusively based on sales as an income-generating factor. Although both alternatives are far from being perfect,
we conclude that a single-sales factor formula offers a large number of advantages and is an efficient method to fight against profit shifting strategies.
1 INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the conclusions of the Economic and Financial
Affairs Council (ECOFIN Council) that took place in
December included a request to the European Commission
(EC) to carry out an analytical study regarding company
taxation in the European Union (EU). In the first place,
this study was to expose existing differences in effective
corporate tax rates amongst Member States (MS). Secondly,
it should identify those fiscal questions that could be ham-
pering cross-border economic activity.
1.1 Tax Obstacles in the Internal Market
In 2001, the EC launched the report Company taxation in
the internal market, which highlighted the existence of big
differentials in effective levels of corporate tax rates
amongst MS.1 According to the report, taxation is only
one of the variables that may influence companies’ invest-
ment and location decisions. However, the high dispersion
amongst effective tax rates seemed to be affecting compa-
nies’ competitiveness. Moreover, these differentials repre-
sented an incentive to invest in the most favourable areas
from a fiscal perspective. Therefore, they could be result-
ing in an inefficient location of resources and, conse-
quently, in losses of welfare.
On the other hand, the EC’s study identified a great
number of tax obstacles to cross-border economic activ-
ity in the internal market. In addition to other negative
consequences, the report insisted on the fact that the
coexistence of fifteen different tax systems in the EU
context justified the use of separate accounting and the
arm’s length principle in order to distribute companies’
income amongst MS for tax purposes. Despite the good-
ness and advantages of this valuation system, the eco-
nomic scenario in 2001 had experienced a high number
of changes and great progress since it was designed.
The use of this system in such a different context was
creating new problems, such as high compliance costs
for companies, high control and management costs for
public authorities, risk of double taxation and risk of
tax evasion through manipulation of transfer prices.
1.2 Targeted Measures and Comprehensive
Approaches
As possible solutions to all these problems, the report
made a distinction between two different approaches. On
the one hand, the Commission referred to particular solu-
tions that would contribute to solve most of the problems
in an isolated way.2 On the other, the EC talked about
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wider solutions to directly tackle the origin of those
problems (and not the problems themselves). Seemingly,
the second proposal would bring about the most
advantages.3
In the EC’s opinion, opting for a comprehensive
approach would provide MS with a common consolidated
corporate tax base (CCCTB). Therefore, it would eliminate
a great number of the existing obstacles all at once. As
long as companies no longer had to deal with fifteen
different tax systems, a CCCTB would mean a great
number of benefits. For instance, it would imply a sig-
nificant reduction of compliance costs for companies,
more efficiency in companies’ location decisions, less risk
of double taxation, less risk of tax evasion, and, in general,
more simplicity, both for companies and tax
administrations.
In line with the EC’s description, the introduction
of a CCCTB in the EU would eliminate the problem
of high dispersion in the existing regulatory frame-
work. Instead of fifteen different tax systems, there
would only be one common set of rules to calculate
corporate tax base. As a second step, the corporate tax
base would be distributed amongst MS where multi-
national companies and cross-border groups of compa-
nies carry out their economic activities. This
distribution would be done according to a sharing
mechanism commonly agreed by MS. Finally, each
MS would apply its own corporate tax rate in order
to tax the specific amount of the company’s profit
generated in its territory. As long as each MS could
decide about applicable tax rates, this approach would
be, in one way or another, respectful of MS sovereignty
in the field of direct taxation.
2 THE PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE
ON A COMMON CONSOLIDATED
CORPORATE TAX BASE (CCCTB)
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
2.1 Overview
The first proposal for a Directive on a CCCTB in the EU
was launched in 2011.4 Up to the present, however, this
proposal has not led to any successful results and remains
at a standstill. This is mainly because it will imply a
major change in the existing set of rules, so that MS
have found great difficulties in reaching an agreement in
this context.
In an attempt to accelerate the decision making
process, the EC decided to launch a new proposal on
a CCCTB in October 2016. The main novelty of the
new proposal is that it consists of two different
Directives that will be introduced progressively.
Firstly, European institutions hope to approve a
Directive for a Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB)
in the EU. After that, the approval of a Directive for a
CCCTB will follow.5
2.2 Objectives
According to the Introduction of the recent proposal for a
Directive on a CCCTB:
the CCCTB features as an effective tool for attributing
income to where the value is created, through a formula
based on three equally weighted factors (i.e. assets,
labour, and sales). Since these factors are attached to
where a company earns its profits, they are more resi-
lient to aggressive tax planning practices than the
widespread transfer pricing methods for allocating
profit.
We conclude that the main purpose of the CCCTB is to
replace transfer pricing, which has been proved to be
ineffective nowadays, with a different method for allocat-
ing income. Such a change is necessary since transfer
pricing does not seem to fit in well with the current
economic scenario. Among other reasons because it:
is not suited with the global nature of international
business. In particular, international production pro-
cesses make the separate accounting system (SA) of
assigning profit to specific geographic destinations
inherently arbitrary. (…) with firms that are truly
integrated across borders, holding related entities at
an ‘arms-length’ standard for the pricing of intra com-
pany transactions does not make sense, nor does allo-
cating income and expenses on a country-by country
basis.6
Closely related to the general purpose, it is possible to
distinguish two specific objectives in the EC’s proposal.
Notes
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5 In Oct. 2016, the European Commission proposed to re-launch the CCCTB. Given that the original proposal proved too ambitious for MS to agree in one go, the
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W. P. S. 6 (2007). Other problems associated with the application of transfer pricing system in the current economic scenario are described in the following pages of the
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On the one hand, the CCCTB is expected to help
European institutions in their fight against profit shifting
and tax evasion. Given that transfer pricing offers great
opportunities for manipulation, both the risk of profit
shifting and the risk of tax evasion are directly related
to the use of this method for allocating income. On the
other hand, the CCCTB proposal hopes to ensure that
companies’ profits are taxed where they have effectively
been earned. Undoubtedly, both specific goals are
highly linked to each other. As experience has demon-
strated, profit-shifting strategies lead to a situation
where companies’ profits are not taxed where they
should be taxed, but in those territories where compa-
nies want profits to be taxed. Therefore, alleviating the
problem of profit shifting (first goal) would help to
ensure that companies’ income is effectively taxed
where value is generated.
2.3 The Sharing Mechanism as a Key Element
of the Proposal
Undoubtedly, the sharing mechanism is one of the key
elements in the Commission’s proposal. Mainly because
its application will determine which MS are competent to
tax cross-border companies’ income and to what extent.
Therefore, it is also an extremely delicate element of the
proposal on a CCCTB. Aware of this fact, European
institutions have repeatedly pointed out that the sharing
mechanism must be fair, equitable, neutral and not liable
to being manipulated.
In 2011, once other important issues about the first
proposal had been discussed, the EC began a round of
debates with MS in order to reach a decision about the
sharing mechanism. As a starting point to these debates, a
basic distinction was made between a macro-level
approach and two micro-level approaches: value-added
approach and formulary apportionment approach.
Afterwards, advantages and disadvantages of each alterna-
tive were discussed.
After the first round of debates, the EC concluded that
all the alternatives had weaknesses and flaws, so that there
was no evidence to confirm that one of them was better
than the others. According to this institution, however, it
was vital to take into consideration that formulary appor-
tionment had traditionally been used (apparently with
satisfying results) in the US and Canada in order to
distribute companies’ profits amongst states for tax
purposes.7 Since then, all the debates about the sharing
mechanism carried out in the European context have
exclusively focused on the design of an apportionment
formula. This implies not only choosing and defining
the factors liable to be used, but also deciding on the
specific weight that should be given to each one of these
factors. Moreover, the:
choice of apportionment formula involves the balancing
of several objectives, including (a) the reflection of
where income originates, (b) the distortion of decisions
on the location of economic activities, (c) the likelihood
of tax competition (…), (d) the risk that the taxpayer
will manipulate apportionment factors to shift income
to low-tax member states, (e) the distribution of reven-
ues among member states, and (f) the ease of
implementation.8
3 THE EXPERIENCE IN THE US STATES
Almost as soon as corporate income tax was introduced in
the US, problems associated with taxation of cross-border
companies appeared. As it happens in the EU, these
problems were mainly caused by the lack of a uniform
tax legislation.
3.1 The So-Called Massachusetts Formula
The first effort to design a multistate tax system for the
US dates from 1915, although it was in 1950 when public
authorities made the decision to design a fair and uniform
mechanism to distribute companies’ profits amongst
American states. The result of this process was the
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
(UDITPA),9 which recommended using the so-called
Massachusetts Formula. This formula was based on three
different factors with identical weights: the proportion of
assets located in the state, the proportion of sales to
resident customers and the proportion of wages paid to
resident workers.
As a starting point in the designing process of the
sharing formula, it was assumed that it is impossible to
find out which precise parts of a company generate each
dollar of income, regardless of in which specific states
those parts of the company are located. From this point
of view, the three factors finally chosen were conceived as
useful indicators to approximate the fraction of the com-
pany’s profit that derives from the economic activity
carried out in each state. In part, the possibility of reach-
ing a reasonable approximation was due to the fact that
these factors ‘reflect how income is generated and
Notes
7 Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group, The Mechanism for Sharing the CCCTB 5 (2006).
8 Poterba, supra n. 3, at 168.
9 Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by the American Bar
Association at its meeting at New York, 16 July 1957.
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recognize the contributions to income made by manufac-
turing and marketing states’.10
Initially, UDITPA’s recommendation was to assign the
same weight to each of the three chosen factors.11 Bearing
in mind the kind of problems generated by the lack of a
uniform tax legislation (especially the high risk of double
taxation), the application of the same formula all around
the country would mean a great step to ensure that profits
of cross-border companies were effectively taxed in the
US, but only once.
3.2 Recent Trends in the US
Over time, however, American states have introduced
changes and variations in the initially recommended
formula. Although it has been a long process, all of
these states have moved in the same direction, giving
more weight to sales. Nowadays, the vast majority of
American states use a formula that gives double weight,
or even more than double, to sales factor. Some of them,
in fact, use a formula exclusively based on sales
(commonly called single-sales factor formula). The
following Table 1 reflects the US’s current scenario
from the point of view of apportionment formulas
effectively employed.
The question that emerges is: why American states
prefer using sales-factor orientated formulas? This ques-
tion is not difficult to answer if we take into consideration
that, according to general opinion, increasing the weight
of sales in the formula leads to important economic
advantages with minimum political cost.12 In 1977,
furthermore, McLure demonstrated that, under certain
conditions, the apportionment formula turns corporate
income tax into a tax on the factors included in the
formula.13 In the light of this assertion, many states
have concluded that reducing the weight of assets and
wages in the formula could lead to important advantages
from the point of view of employment and companies’
investment. On top of that, as assets and wages are prone
to manipulation by companies, reducing the role these
factors play in the process of distributing the tax base
could also have positive consequences from the perspective
of economic growth and social welfare.14
4 THE CCCTB APPORTIONMENT FORMULA
4.1 Description
Both the first EC proposal and the second one suggest a
sharing mechanism based on the application of a three-
factor formula. This formula includes three different fac-
tors with equal weighting: assets, sales and labour.
Although it shows great similarity with the
Massachusetts formula, two important differences between
them must be pointed out. The first one refers to the
labour factor, while the second is related to the weight of
the factors included in the formula.
As for the labour factor, UDITPA’s recommended for-
mula only considered wages that companies pay for resi-
dent workers. In contrast, the European proposal not only
takes into consideration the amount of wages paid to
workers, but also the number of employees in each MS.
This new factor is expected to play an adjustment role,
since wage differences between MS can produce distor-
tions when it comes to dividing companies’ income
amongst them on the grounds of the labour factor.15
Regarding the second difference, the CCCTB proposal
prohibits MS from changing the weight of the factors
included in the formula, as it happens in the US. While
the Massachusetts formula only recommends American
states to use three equally weighting factors, the
European makes it compulsory MS to do this. As the
American experience has shown, states find incentives to
deviate from the initially recommended formula.16 The
EC’s objective when reducing MS’ scope for action, there-
fore, would consist of avoiding the risk of double taxation
or double non-taxation in the field of business income.
Obviously:
Under a system of individually-determined factor
weights per jurisdiction, more or less than 100% of
the overall group tax base can be subject to taxation.
(…) By contrast, the common system does not produce
tax base uncertainty since all jurisdictions are bound to
apply exactly the same formula. Hence, even if jurisdic-
tions agree on changing their common apportionment
formula, it is still guaranteed that exactly 100% of the
overall group tax base is tax-liable.17
Notes
10 Joann M. Weiner, Formulary Apportionment and the Future of Company Taxation in the European Union, 3(1) CESifo Forum 17 (2002).
11 According to UDITPA, s. 9, ‘All business income shall be apportioned (…) by multiplying the income by a fraction, the numerator of which is the property factor plus the
payroll factor plus the sales factor, and the denominator of which is three.’ The key element, as we can see, is ‘shall’, commonly used to make a suggestion.
12 A general criticism of this thesis can be found in Michael Mazerov, The ‘Single Sales Factor’ Formula for State Corporate Taxes. A Boon to Economic Development or a Costly
Giveaway?Washington D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2005).
13 Charles E. McLure, State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing?, 25 OTA Paper (1977).
14 See Charles E. McLure & Walter Hellerstein, Does Sales-Only Apportionment Violate International Trade Rules?, 96(11) Tax Notes 1516 (2002).
15 See Charles E. McLure, Replacing Separate Entity Accounting and the Arm’s Length Principle with Formulary Apportionment, 56(12) Bull. Int’l Fiscal Documentation (2002).
16 Regarding the reasons why jurisdictions choose different weights in the apportionment formula, see Bharat N. Anand & Richard Sansing, The Weighting Game: Formula
Apportionment as an Instrument of Public Policy, 53(2) Nat’l Tax J. (2000).




According to existing literature, each of the three factors
included in the formula raises doubts.18 For instance, the
location of assets, labour and sales is sometimes difficult
to identify. Valuation of assets and treatment that must be
given to sales of intermediate products between companies
Table 1 State Apportionment of Corporate Income (Formulas for Tax Year 2017 – as of 1 Jan. 2017)
ALABAMA* Double wtd Sales NEBRASKA Sales
ALASKA* 3 Factor NEVADA No State Income tax
ARIZONA* Sales/Double wtd Sales NEW HAMPSHIRE Double wtd Sales
ARKANSAS* Double wtd Sales NEW JERSEY Sales
CALIFORNIA* Sales NEW MEXICO*(3) 80% Sales. 10% Property &
Payroll
COLORADO* Sales NEW YORK Sales
CONNECTICUT Sales NORTH CAROLINA*(3) Quadruple wtd sales
DELAWARE (4) Double wtd Sales NORTH DAKOTA* 3 Factor
FLORIDA Double wtd Sales OHIO N/A (2)
GEORGIA Sales OKLAHOMA 3 Factor
HAWAII* 3 Factor OREGON Sales
IDAHO* Double wtd Sales PENNSYLVANIA Sales
ILLINOIS* Sales RHODE ISLAND Sales
INDIANA Sales SOUTH CAROLINA Sales
IOWA Sales SOUTH DAKOTA No State Income tax
KANSAS* 3 Factor TENNESSEE Triple wtd Sales
KENTUCKY* Double wtd Sales TEXAS Sales
LOUISIANA 3 Factor UTAH Sales
MAINE* Sales VERMONT Double wtd Sales
MARYLAND Sales/ Double wtd Sales VIRGINIA Double wtd Sales/Sales
MASSACHUSETTS Sales/ Double wtd Sales WASHINGTON No State Income tax
MICHIGAN Sales WEST VIRGINIA* Double wtd Sales
MINNESOTA Sales WISCONSIN* Sales
MISSISSIPPI Sales/Other (1) WYOMING No State Income tax
MISSOURI* 3 Factor DIST. OF COLUMBIA Sales
MONTANA* 3 Factor
Source: Compiled by the Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA) TA from state sources.
Notes
18 See Ana Agúndez-García, The Delineation and Apportionment of an EU Consolidated Tax Base for Multi-Jurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation: A Review of Issues and Options, (9)
Tax’n Papers 47–57 (2006).
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located in different MS appear as problematic issues as
well. Despite this fact, sales factor has traditionally been
the most controversial one.19
Amongst the main criticisms, some authors have stated
that sales factor doubles the effect of Value-Added Tax
(VAT) on destination MS when it is introduced in the
apportionment formula.20 Furthermore, it is commonly
thought that using the sales factor harms net exporting
states, who theoretically suffer a reduction of public
income in favour of net importing states.21 Finally, there
is no agreement about the role that sales really play in the
allocation process of the corporate tax base amongst MS.
This controversy is clearly reflected by McLure (2007),
according to which:
While there seems to be strong support for using
payroll and property to apportion income, support
for also using sales appears to be much weaker. (…)
Some believe that sales at destination should be
included to reflect the contribution of demand to
the earning of corporate income. Others counter
that sales at destination have no place in the for-
mula, because income is created where production
occurs.22
In the same line, Agúndez-García points out that:
The theoretical rationale for including gross receipts as
an apportioning factor (…) is recognising the role that
the place of demand plays in corporate profits: after all,
profits would not be made if the goods were not sold
somewhere. Thus, demand is thought to create com-
pany income by itself (…). Others (…), however, ques-
tion whether mere demand constitutes an income-
producing factor and, as a consequence, whether a
part of the taxable income should be assigned to the
demand jurisdictions solely for providing a consumer
market.23
5 ANTI-ABUSE RULES IN THE PROPOSAL
FOR A DIRECTIVE ON A CCCTB
5.1 Overview
In accordance with its earliest approach, transfer pri-
cing leads to an optimal allocation of companies’
profits to those territories where they have effectively
been earned. From this perspective, it is a perfect
apportionment method. In the last few years, however,
companies have found incentives to manipulate trans-
fer prices with the aim of avoiding taxes or
obtaining tax advantages, so that the transfer pricing
system has become an ineffective method to reach its
initial goals.
It is assumed that existing incentives to aggressive tax
planning will experience an important reduction with the
introduction of an apportionment formula. As said in the
Introduction of the European proposal on a CCCTB, this
is due to the fact that chosen factors are closely linked to
the place where companies develop their economic activity
and, consequently, to the place where companies earn
their income. This way, profits will be taxed where they
are really obtained and not where companies want them to
be taxed.
The truth, however, is that factors included in the
apportionment formula are also prone to manipulation to
a certain extent. Given that European institutions are
aware of this fact, the EC’s proposal on a CCCTB includes
a series of anti-abuse rules.
5.2 Labour Factor (Wages and Number
of Employees)
According to Article 33 of the proposal, employees
must be included in the labour factor of the company
that pays their wages. Exceptionally, when an
employee is effectively working for a different com-
pany of the same group, so that the entity monitoring
the employee’s job and the entity paying the employ-
ee’s salary are not the same, he/she must be included
in the labour factor of the company that controls his/
her job.
In the second place, Article 33 establishes that the
labour factor also includes those people who have not
directly been hired by the company, but work effectively
for it in similar or identical terms to the rest of hired
employees.
Finally, Article 33.4 points out that the labour factor
must include not only wages but also any kind of remu-
neration paid to employees as a compensation for their
work, as well as costs associated with pension funds and
social security. For instance, payments in kind or gifts will
Notes
19 See Walter Hellerstein & Charles E. McLure, The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU Can Learn from the Experience of the US States, 11(2) Int’l
Tax & Pub. Fin. 14, 15 (2004).
20 According to these authors, the aim of corporate taxation is to tax production and not consumption, which is already taxed by VAT in the EU. When the sales factors is
included in the apportionment formula, they add, marketing countries benefit twice, as they are remunerated via corporate taxation and via VAT.
21 See Anand & Sansing, supra n. 16, at 184.
22 Poterba, supra n. 3, at 169, 170.
23 Agúndez-García, supra n. 18, at 52, 53.
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have the same consideration as wages from the point of
view of apportionment.
Undoubtedly, these three provisions can be defined as
anti-abuse rules, since they try to avoid the manipulation
of the labour factor (both wages and number of employees)
with the only purpose of reducing its weight in those MS
with higher tax rates (and vice versa). As a result of these
manipulation strategies, a greater part of the group’s tax
base (if not the whole tax base) would be assigned to those
MS with lower tax rates and, in this way, the group could
obtain important tax savings.
5.3 Assets Factor
Assets factor is said to provide great opportunities for
manipulation. Mainly, because some types of assets, such
as intangible assets, financial assets or inventory, are
extremely mobile. Easy access to mechanisms to separate
legal and economic ownership, such as leasing, is another
source of manipulation in this field.
According to the EC’s proposal, intangible assets,
inventory and financial assets will not be regarded when
it comes to apportioning companies’ income amongst MS.
Without any doubt, this legal provision will contribute to
fight against profit shifting more effectively, given that
these three types of assets are highly prone to
manipulation.
From the location perspective, Article 35 of the propo-
sal on a CCCTB indicates that assets will be assigned to
the MS where their economic owner is established. Only
when the economic owner cannot be identified, will an
asset be assigned to its legal owner. Again, these provi-
sions try to avoid manipulation of assets factor with the
only purpose of benefitting from tax savings.
Finally, Article 36.5 refers to the situation in which one
company sells an asset to a different company of the same
group and, either the same year or the following one, the
same asset is sold to a third party. In that case, the asset
will have to be included in the assets factor of the initial
owner in order to avoid manipulation and profit shifting.
Exceptionally, this anti-abuse rule will not be applied
when the group demonstrates that the internal operation
was due to commercial reasons.
5.4 Sales Factor
Concerning the definition of the sales factor, the CCCTB
proposal opts for a strict regulation in order to guarantee
that group’s income not coming from its ordinary eco-
nomic activity is excluded from the apportionment for-
mula. This is the case of income derived from interest
payment, dividends and royalties. The reason for this
exclusion is closely linked to the European fight against
aggressive tax planning, as this kind of income can be
shifted from one MS to another in quite an easy and cheap
way.
On the other hand, the EC’s proposal expressly excludes
from the apportionment formula positive and negative
results coming from internal operations, i.e. operations
between companies of the same group. Apart from not
contributing to generate real profits for the group, the
inclusion of such operations would oblige companies and
tax authorities to use transfer pricing. Therefore, problems
associated with manipulation and tax evasion would
appear again.
6 COMMENTS ON THE EUROPEAN PROPOSAL
FOR A CCCTB
6.1 Flaws of the Proposal
It is widely believed that the EC’s proposal on a CCCTB
will not completely eliminate the risk of tax evasion and
profit shifting.24 Amongst other reasons, because the fac-
tors included in the formula are prone to manipulation to
a greater or lesser extent. In addition to this criticism, I
believe that the suggested formula, based on a combina-
tion of assets, labour and sales, is far from being econom-
ically consistent for three reasons.
First of all, we have to take into consideration that
companies earn profits in those territories where they
develop an economic activity. Economic activity includes
both production and sales. Assets and labour, which
represent production activity, are two productive factors.
By contrast, sales contributes to generate income but is
not a productive factor itself. At least, this is what eco-
nomic theory tells us. The fact that a company’s income is
only realized when goods and services are sold does not
allow us to include sales in the list of traditional produc-
tive factors (wages, assets, land, technology, knowledge,
etc.).
In the second place, it is important to highlight that
sales depend on production level and, in turn, production
level depends on the use of productive factors. When a
company decides to use only assets and labour as produc-
tive factors, as is the case, the company’s sales will be a
function of assets and labour.
Finally, we have to bear in mind that a company’s
profit is defined by the positive difference between income
(sales, supply of services, etc.) and all expenses that are
necessary to generate it (purchases, wages, asset costs,
etc.). The suggested formula does not seem to be coherent
Notes
24 See Dirk Kiesewetter et al., Can Formula Apportionment Really Prevent Multinational Enterprises from Profit Shifting? – The Role of Asset Valuation, Intragroup Debt, and Leases, 175
Arqus Discussion Papers (2014).
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in the light of this definition, since it distributes compa-
nies’ profits amongst MS based on an addition of two
negative components (assets and labour) and a positive
one (sales).
6.2 Alternative Formulas
It seems that European institutions should revise their
proposal and suggest a new formula before continuing
with the CCCTB negotiation process. This formula must
be economically consistent and, at the same time, it must
be suitable for reaching the intended objectives.
Personally, I believe that two different alternatives should
be discussed: a two-factor formula, based on assets and
labour as productive factors, and a formula exclusively
based on sales as an income generating factor. Both alter-
natives are coherent with Agúndez-García’s opinion,
according to which: ‘The choice of factors and their
weighting cannot really be founded on principled scien-
tific methodology, but they should ultimately reflect the
political preferences as to the purpose of corporate taxa-
tion (whether it should remunerate producing or market-
ing states). The only correct rule might simply be the one
on which Member States can agree.’25
7 A TWO-FACTOR FORMULA FOR THE EU
7.1 Overview
One of the main purposes of the EC’s proposal is to help
European institutions in their fight against profit shifting
strategies. This major advance will contribute to ensure
that companies’ income is taxed in MS where they have
been effectively earned. As far as I am concerned, the most
reasonable method to try to reach both goals at the same
time consists of a formula based on two factors: assets and
labour.
From an economic point of view, a formula based on
these two factors is fully consistent. First, because both
labour and assets are productive factors, according to
economic theory. In the second place, because both assets
and labour work as negative components when it comes to
calculating a company’s profit.
7.2 Advantages
Regarding its advantages, such an apportionment formula
would lead to an appropriate distribution of companies’
income amongst MS. As labour and assets are productive
factors, the suggested formula would assign the tax base
to those territories where companies produce the goods
and services they subsequently sell in order to earn profits.
On top of that, the resulting distribution of the tax base
amongst MS would be closer to the real situation, i.e. the
resulting distribution would allow the identification of
those MS where value is truly generated.
7.3 Disadvantages
It is a fact, however, that a two-factor formula does not
resolve inefficiency in location decisions nor the problem
of profit shifting. First of all, we have to bear in mind that
companies can decide where to locate productive factors,
such as labour and assets. As opposed to what happens
with sales, labour and, especially, assets are mobile to a
greater or lesser extent. On the other hand, experience has
demonstrated that assets and labour are prone to manip-
ulation. Although it is true that the EC’s proposal
includes a series of anti-abuse rules in order to avoid this
problem, some scholars are convinced that there will still
be scope for factor manipulation.26
7.4 Concluding Remarks
Although an apportionment formula based on labour and
assets will not resolve efficiency problems and will not
eliminate the risk of profit shifting, I think it will notably
contribute to reduce both issues. Amongst other reasons,
because public administrations will find it easier and
cheaper to control location of only two productive factors
than continuing with the application of transfer pricing.
8 A SINGLE-SALES FACTOR FORMULA
FOR THE EU
8.1 Overview
The second alternative for distributing the tax base con-
sists of a formula exclusively based on sales by
destination.27 The starting point of this proposal is that
none apportionment formula is able to assign companies’
profits to the MS where they have been effectively earned.
Accordingly, the only thing we can do is looking for a
more efficient method to fight against profit shifting.
Compared to a formula based on labour and assets, a
formula exclusively based on sales by destination would
not lead to such an accurate distribution of companies’
income. However, as long as companies’ income were
Notes
25 Agúndez-García, supra n. 18, at 46.
26 According to Kiesewetter et al., supra n. 24, at 2, ‘Quite in contrast to the EC’s view that the proposed system will offer more neutrality and less opportunities for tax
planning, we expect a simple shift in tax planning strategies to occur from the calculation of the tax base to the determination of the apportionment factors.’
27 A similar proposal can be found in Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra n. 6, at 10–13.
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distributed on the ground of consumption, this option
would notably reduce the problem of tax evasion.
8.2 Advantages
From my perspective, it is possible to identify at least four
advantages of using a formula exclusively based on sales
by destination. First of all, we have to take into considera-
tion that, as opposed to what happens with assets and
labour, sales are not a mobile factor. Companies cannot
decide where to sell their products and services. They have
no more option than selling in those territories where
their customers are located, regardless of tax rate levels.
As tax considerations would be irrelevant in this new
context, productive factors would be located in those MS
where they are more efficient and cost-effective. Therefore,
the application of a formula exclusively based on sales by
destination would imply greater efficiency in companies’
decision making process.
Closely related to improvement in efficiency level, the
introduction of a single-sales factor formula would
reduce tax competition amongst MS. Given that tax
issues would become irrelevant, MS would not have
incentives to reduce tax rates in order to attract compa-
nies’ interest. On the other hand, as the amount of
wages, the number of employees and the total value of
assets would not affect companies’ tax debt, this method
would lead to a growth of employment and investment
rate in aggregate terms.28 This argument, however, is
harshly criticized by Mazerov, according to whom ‘A
thorough consideration of a large body of research on
the impact of state business tax policy on economic
development and of all the incentives created by a
sales-only formula points to the conclusion that adoption
of such a formula is likely to be relatively ineffectual,
potentially counterproductive, and not cost-effective
incentive for job creation and investment.’29
In the second place, single-sales factor formula would
contribute to fight against tax evasion and profit shifting
more efficiently. Amongst other reasons, this apportion-
ment method is based on a close connection between
corporate income tax and value added tax, so public
authorities would be able to take advantage of synergies
in control activity. On top of that, we have to bear in
mind that location of sales has traditionally been quite a
controversial issue. Nevertheless, if we decided to apply a
single-sales factor formula based on destination to appor-
tion income, this problem would be resolved with the
application of VAT location rules.30 In this sense, we
have to take into consideration that ‘VAT is established
in most countries and even harmonized in the EU.
Compared to the development of a new set of rules,
resorting to the approved VAT system would save admin-
istrative costs and introduction costs alike’.31
Furthermore, this option ‘could minimize the costs of
data collection, because the VA key could work with
data already collected and reported for the EU VAT
system’.32
Thirdly, as the suggested formula is exclusively based
on one factor, it would be easier and cheaper for public
authorities to administer and control operations between
related companies. The connection between corporate
income tax and VAT would also contribute to achieving
this result.
From a macroeconomic perspective, this system could
lead to better distribution of wealth amongst MS. Given
that companies’ income would be distributed amongst MS
on the grounds of sales, net importing states would
experience an improvement in terms of public income,
whilst net exporting states would suffer an income loss.33
Bearing in mind that net importing states’ balance of
payments is negative by definition, the growth of public
income would undeniable imply an improvement of their
economic situation in comparative terms. In accordance
with this argument, Avi-Yonah and Clausing (2007) refer
to the ‘the widespread belief that imposing taxes on
imports and exempting boosts national competitiveness
and reduces trade deficits’.34
8.3 Disadvantages
Concerning its drawbacks, the starting point of this
alternative is that none apportionment formula is able
to assign companies’ profits to those territories where
they have effectively been earned. Therefore, a formula
based on sales as the only apportionment factor would
lead to an inadequate or imprecise distribution of com-
panies’ tax base amongst MS. Basically, because such a
method ignores the role of assets and labour as income
generating factors. According to many scholars, how-
ever, the purpose of the apportionment formula is not
to search for the ‘true’ source of income, but ‘assigning
Notes
28 According to Anand & Sansing, supra n. 16, at 184, ‘a state using DWSF [double weight the sales factor] will be more attractive place to locate the property and payroll of a
business enterprise operating in multiple states than a corresponding EWF [equal weighted formula state]’.
29 Mazerov, supra n. 12, at 38.
30 Concerning advantages related to a close connection between corporate income tax and VAT, see Agúndez-García, supra n. 18, at 69–85.
31 Norbert Herzig et al., Between Extremes: Merging the Advantages of Separate Accounting and Unitary Taxation, 38(6/7) Intertax 347 (2010).
32 Agúndez-García, supra n. 18, at 83.
33 A demonstration can be found in Kelly D. Edmiston, Strategic Apportionment of the State Corporate Income Tax. An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis, 2 Nat’l Tax J. (2002).
34 Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra n. 6, at 12.
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income taxing rights across the countries with a “rea-
sonable” claim to it’.35
On the other hand, changing to a sales-factor formula
could lead to a completely different situation in terms of
income distribution amongst MS for tax purposes.36
Although it is not possible to predict the specific results
of the proposal from an aggregated point of view, indivi-
dual losses and profits could be noticeable. I suggest an
example to illustrate this statement.
Company A has its residence in Spain. This company
produces all its goods in Spain, but sells all its production
in France. According to current law, if company A
decided to directly sell its products to French customers,
i.e. without a permanent establishment (PE) in France, the
whole income of the company would be taxed in Spain. If
we decided to use a single-sales factor formula to allocate
companies’ profits, however, the whole income of com-
pany A would be taxed in France.
On the other hand, if company A decided to sell its
products in France not directly, but through a PE in that
territory, the result would also be quite different.
According to current legislation, A’s income would be
taxed both in Spain and in France. Nevertheless, if a
single-sales factor formula were applied, the whole
income of company A would be taxed in France.
Irrespective of the followed strategy, therefore, A’s
whole income would be taxed in France because it is
here that their products are sold and effectively
consumed.
8.4 Concluding Remarks
Undoubtedly, the application of a single-sales factor for-
mula could substantially change the geographical distri-
bution of companies’ tax base amongst MS, making the
approval of a new set of rules difficult.37 However, I
disagree with those scholars who refer to changes in tax
base distribution as a negative aspect of the European
proposal. Furthermore, even if this result was regarded
as a drawback, it is vital to take into consideration the
large number of advantages that the proposal would
imply. For instance, lower compliance costs for compa-
nies, lower monitoring costs for public administrations,
greater efficiency in companies’ location decisions and less
risk of tax evasion.
On the other hand, it is a fact that some experts have
pointed out that using a formula exclusively based on sales
would lead to a double taxation on consumption. In
relation to this assertion, however, I think it is necessary
to make a distinction between taxing companies’ income,
on the one hand, and locating companies’ income, on the
other. When we decide to use a single-sales factor formula
we are only choosing a method to distribute companies’
profits amongst MS. However, those profits are going to
be taxed anyway, irrespective of the applicable sharing
mechanism. In other words, ‘the inclusion of a factor in
the formula does not imply a new taxation of this factor
but the allocation of taxing rights among taxing jurisdic-
tions on the consolidated tax base (the individual tax bases
would be taxed in any case)’.38
9 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The main purpose of the proposal on a CCCTB is to
replace transfer pricing with a new method for allocating
companies’ income. As a result, the new method is
expected to combat profit shifting strategies and to ensure
that companies’ income is taxed where it has been earned.
After analysing different available alternatives, however,
we conclude that it is impossible to design a perfect
apportionment formula.
The EC’s initial proposal for a sharing mechanism is
pretty similar to the so-called Massachusetts formula, as it
is based on three equally weighted factors: assets, labour
and sales. To my mind, however, such a formula is not
consistent from an economic point of view. Amongst
other reasons, because it combines two productive factors
(assets and labour) with a component like sales, which is
not a productive factor and, at the same time, is a function
of assets and labour. On top of that, experience has shown
that there is scope for profit shifting when the
Massachusetts formula is applied.
The two alternatives we suggest in this article are a
two-factor formula, based on assets and labour, and a one-
factor formula, exclusively based on sales by destination.
Initially, the first option leads to a more accurate alloca-
tion of companies’ income. Nevertheless, it does not
resolve three main problems: inefficiency in companies’
decisions about location and investment, profit shifting
and tax evasion.
The second option, for its part, leads to a worse dis-
tribution of companies’ profits amongst MS, since it com-
pletely ignores the role of assets and labour as income
generating factors. However, its contribution to the
European fight against profit-shifting strategies is highly
relevant.
Notes
35 In relation to this issue, see Agúndez-García, supra n. 18, at 33–37.
36 See Clemens Fuest et al., How Would the Introduction of an EU-wide Formula Apportionment Affect the Distribution and Size of the Corporate Tax Base? An Analysis Based on German
Multinationals, 14 Int’l Tax Pub. Fin. (2007).
37 In the same line, see Agúndez-García, supra n. 18, at 53.
38 Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group, An Overview of the Main Issues that Emerged During the Discussion on the Sharing Mechanism SG6 Second Meeting – 11
June 2007 9 (2007).
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In conclusion, it is clear that none apportionment for-
mula, technically correct from an economic point of view,
can help us to reach all the objectives described in the
European proposal at the same time. Given this situation,
it seems that European institutions must answer a
question before making any decision about the sharing
mechanism: for the convenience of the EU, does it make
sense to renounce an accurate distribution of companies’
income amongst MS in favour of the fight against profit
shifting?
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